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Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: 
The Role of Moral Hazard
*
 
This paper studies the cyclical dynamics of Mortensen and Pissarides' (1994) model of job 
creation and destruction when workers' effort is not perfectly observable, as in Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984). An occasionally-binding no-shirking constraint truncates the real wage 
distribution from below, making firms' share of surplus weakly procyclical, and may thus 
amplify fluctuations in hiring. It may also cause a burst of inefficient firing at the onset of a 
recession, separating matches that no longer have sufficient surplus for incentive 
compatibility. On the other hand, since marginal workers in booms know firms cannot commit 
to keep them in recessions, they place little value on their jobs and are expensive to 
motivate. For a realistic calibration, this last effect is by far the strongest; even a moderate 
degree of moral hazard can eliminate all fluctuation in the separation rate. This casts doubt 
on Ramey and Watson's (1997) “contractual fragility" mechanism, and means worker moral 
hazard only makes the “unemployment volatility puzzle" worse. However, moral hazard has 
potential to explain other labor market facts, because it is consistent with small but clearly 
countercyclical fluctuations in separation rates, and a robust Beveridge curve. 
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Matching models are now widely applied in macroeconomic and microeconomic studies
of unemployment, but their empirical success remains controversial, as recent discus-
sion of the \unemployment volatility puzzle" has shown (Hall 2005a, Shimer 2005a,
Costain and Reiter 2008, Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008).1 The predominant conclu-
sion from these debates, advocated by Hall and Shimer,2 points to the eects of wage
rigidity (in new jobs) on job creation. Wage rigidity increases the procyclicality of
prots, amplifying uctuations in hiring incentives and thus in vacancies and unem-
ployment. Alternatively, time variation in job separation rates has also been identied
as a margin that might drive unemployment uctuations, by Mortensen and Nagypal
(2007a) and Fujita and Ramey (2009), among others; but these authors do not attempt
to explain why the separation rate varies. One theory that derives amplication en-
tirely from the separation margin is the \contractual fragility" mechanism of Ramey
and Watson (1997) and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (1999). These papers stress
incentive problems as a way of enhancing the countercyclicality of separation rates,
arguing that in recessions, workers and rms may be forced to sever their relationships
because match surplus is insucient to maintain incentive compatibility.
In this paper, we study the cyclical dynamics of a version of the Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) model that incorporates aspects of both these approaches to labor
market volatility. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we consider a moral hazard prob-
lem in which rms cannot perfectly monitor workers' eort. Therefore, a rm-worker
pair bargain over match surplus subject to a no-shirking condition. This constraint
truncates the wage distribution from below, and since we assume the utility cost of
eort varies less than labor productivity, rms may have to pay workers a larger share
of match surplus in recessions, making prots more procyclical. Therefore, this form
of downward wage rigidity has the potential to amplify uctuations in hiring. By the
same token, the incentive compatibility constraint may force rms to terminate jobs
that still have positive surplus, if this surplus is insucient to prevent shirking. There-
fore, moral hazard also has the potential to cause a burst of inecient separations
when a negative aggregate shock occurs.
1Recent surveys on the theory and applications of labor market matching models include Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), Rogerson, Wright, and Shimer (2005), and
Yashiv (2007). Other empirical critiques of matching models, on grounds independent of \Shimer's
puzzle", include Cole and Rogerson (1999), Fujita (2004), and Ravn (2006).
2See also Gertler and Trigari (2008), Walsh (2005), and Krause and Lubik (2007).
2With its no-shirking condition, our model considers a form of real downward wage
rigidity that applies to new as well as continuing jobs, and microfounds it on informa-
tional frictions. Our form of wage rigidity is less extreme than that in models where
wage stickiness is imposed as an arbitrary constraint (like Shimer 2004 or Gertler and
Trigari 2008), but this is realistic, since empirically wage rigidity for new jobs appears
weak (Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens 2008). Thus our goal here is not a new \solution"
for the unemployment volatility puzzle, but rather a qualitative and quantitative anal-
ysis of search and matching under one of the canonical structural models of rigid wages.
Several papers have studied the ip side of information asymmetry in labor relations,
namely rms' private information about match productivity (Menzio 2005; Kennan
2008; Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright 2008). Others have looked at moral hazard in
the steady state of the Mortensen-Pissarides model (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999,
Rocheteau 2001, Jansen 2001, Tawara 2008), or in a dynamic setup with exogenous
separation (Bruggemann and Moscarini 2007, Park 2007).3 However, we know of no
other study of the cyclical dynamics of a matching model with endogenous separation
subject to a no-shirking constraint, and we identify a number of eects absent in papers
that focus on steady states or on exogenous or ecient separation.4
Another ongoing controversy our model naturally addresses concerns the relative
importance of the hiring and separation margins for labor market uctuations. Using
new data, Shimer (2005b) and Hall (2005b) argue that changes in separation rates
matter much less for unemployment dynamics than was previously thought; Fujita and
Ramey (2009) and Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009) dispute this, arguing that inows
into unemployment explain at least 35-40% of the rise in unemployment in US postwar
recessions. Either way, by taking both the hiring and separation margins seriously,
our model can confront a wider range of cyclical facts. As Figure 1 shows, hiring and
separation rates are strongly negatively correlated, and the separation rate rises in every
NBER-identied recession. Thus a complete understanding of the cyclical dynamics of
unemployment requires a model with endogenous job destruction, but full wage rigidity
is therefore a problematic assumption since it may imply inecient separations that
ought to be prevented by renegotiation, as Barro (1977) pointed out. Our framework
takes this issue into account since it models the implications of information constraints
for wages and separation simultaneously, allowing for unlimited renegotiation.
3Park (2007) endogenizes temporary layos but treats permanent separation as exogenous.
4Mortensen and Nagypal (2007b) show that under certain conditions, ecient endogenous sepa-
ration implies unemployment dynamics that are observationally equivalent to the case of exogenous
separation. But under asymmetric information this is no longer true, since separation is inecient
and workers' surplus share varies.
3Moral hazard complicates the Mortensen-Pissarides framework, because it implies
that match surplus is unlikely to be a continuous function. Under full information,
separation only occurs when it is mutually benecial, so surplus goes continuously
to zero at the separation threshold. But with unobservable eort, violation of the
no-shirking condition drives output suddenly to zero, making the surplus function
discontinuous. A related issue is that even xing aggregate labor market conditions,
the separation problem of a rm-worker pair may have multiple solutions, because the
amount of surplus and therefore also the no-shirking constraint both depend on the
rm's reservation thresholds. That is, if for any reason a marginal worker expects to
be red more frequently, the rm will have to pay them more to induce eort, and
may therefore simply prefer to re them. Due to this feedback between the reservation
strategy and the minimum incentive-compatible wage, contraction properties of the
original Mortensen-Pissarides model no longer apply. Nonetheless, using arguments like
those of Rustichini (1998), we show in Section 3 that there exists a unique maximal
surplus function and minimal vector of reservation thresholds that satisfy incentive
compatibility. By focusing on this unique pairwise-optimal equilibrium, we eectively
restrict attention to outcomes that are not subject to the Barro (1977) critique.
To preview our results, in Section 4 we show analytically in a simplied example
that moral hazard may, in theory, increase or decrease the variability of the separation
rate. If the probability of passing from boom to recession is suciently low, rms
will re their least productive workers at the start of a recession, and the fraction
red is increasing in the degree of moral hazard. But when the probability of passing
from boom to recession is higher, we obtain the opposite eect: greater moral hazard
decreases the spike of ring at the onset of a recession, and we calculate a parameter
threshold beyond which the reservation productivities collapse to a single value, so
that the separation rate is constant over the business cycle. We also show that greater
moral hazard increases the procyclicality of rms' surplus share, which tends to make
hiring more variable.
In Section 5, we calibrate our model to U.S. data. Surprisingly, given the ambiguity
of the theoretical results, our quantitative ndings are strong and robust: moral hazard
decreases cyclical labor market volatility, primarily by smoothing or even eliminating
uctuations in the ring rate. The intuition behind this nding is a time-inconsistency
problem. In booms some marginal jobs survive that are destroyed when the economy
goes into recession. Since rms cannot commit to maintain these marginal jobs in the
future, they need to pay a higher ow of surplus to workers in these jobs to prevent
shirking. Hence, while the no-shirking constraint makes workers more expensive overall,
raising the reservation productivities and causing inecient job churning, it especially
4aects the cost of marginal workers in booms. This is why it can push up the reservation
threshold for booms until it coincides with the threshold for recessions, at which point
all variation in separation rates is eliminated.
Thus the idea that incentive problems could amplify uctuations of separation fails
in a calibrated dynamic model; in fact, the forward-looking nature of wage bargaining
actually reverses the result. Existing papers on \contractual fragility" missed this point
because they either analyzed the eects of a one-time shock to productivity, or, as in
Ramey and Watson (1997), assumed an i.i.d. idiosyncratic productivity component, so
that next period's expected productivity is the same for all jobs. In contrast, in our
model idiosyncratic productivity is persistent, as in the data.5 The strong stabilizing
eect of moral hazard on separation rates means that our model makes no progress
on the unemployment volatility issue. Nonetheless, it is strikingly consistent with the
recent claims that unemployment variability is driven mostly by job creation, not by
job destruction. Moreover, because our model amplies uctuations in creation while
diminishing those of destruction, it also exhibits a robust Beveridge curve.
2 Model
This section describes a version of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model with large
rms and imperfectly observable worker eort. Firms motivate workers by paying a
surplus on top of the reservation wage, and threatening to re shirkers. Jobs are severed
when negative productivity shocks render them unprotable.
2.1 Agents, preferences and technology
The economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral workers and rms. We
normalize the mass of workers to one and we assume the number of rms is innitesimal
relative to the number of workers. Time is continuous and the innitely-lived workers
and rms discount the future at the common rate r. Firms produce a unique nal
good, using labor as the only input.







[ct + (1   ht)b]e
 rtdt; (1)
where ct is consumption at time t, ht 2 f0;1g is the fraction of time devoted to work
and b is the constant value of leisure. Without loss of generality, we assume that
5For a recent analysis of U.S. plant-level productivity dynamics, see Abraham and White (2007).
5workers consume their entire income at all times; so when a worker is employed, ct
equals the wage, wt. In addition, an employed worker can set eort to zero (ht = 0),
which we will call \shirking". Accordingly, the ow utility of a worker who exerts eort
is U(wt;1) = wt, while that of a worker who shirks is U(wt;0) = wt + b. Unemployed
workers enjoy leisure but receive no income, and so U(0;0) = b.6
Firms have access to a constant-returns production technology. Each rm can
create a continuum of jobs, which are either vacant or lled by a worker; the output of
a lled job is Y (x;y;h) = (x+y)h. Here x is a match-specic productivity process; its
realizations are observed by both the rm and the worker but not by anyone outside
the match. The second component y is an aggregate productivity process, common to
all jobs and observed by all agents. Finally, note that the ow output of a job drops
to zero whenever the worker shirks (h = 0).
We assume rms cannot monitor eort perfectly. A rm always observes its total
output, which reveals the average eort level of its many employees (formally a con-
tinuum). Also, any given individual worker's eort level is observed at a xed Poisson
rate ' per unit of time, but this observation is private and cannot be veried in court.
Therefore, at any point in time, a rm only observes the eort of an innitesimal frac-
tion (formally, zero measure) of its workforce. Faced with this moral hazard problem,
rms can oer incentives by paying workers a surplus above their reservation wage,
if they can credibly commit to re anyone caught shirking. That is, in a nontrivial
equilibrium,7 wages must satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint which ensures
that a worker's value of exerting eort to avoid ring exceeds the value of shirking. We
will see that this no-shirking condition (NSC) may or may not bind in equilibrium.8
In the rest of this section we explain how this version of the shirking model can
be embedded into a standard matching model of unemployment with endogenous job
creation and destruction.
6The assumption that shirking delivers the same utility from leisure as unemployment is just a
normalization. See Section 2.4.1 for details.
7The model also has a trivial equilibrium in which rms create no jobs because they conjecture
that workers never accept jobs or always shirk. We ignore this uninteresting alternative.
8This contrasts with the equilibrium in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), where a rm can costlessly
adjust the size of its workforce, and therefore need not pay more than the wage at which the NSC binds.
But when there are labor market frictions, a matched pair enjoys a surplus, and the worker's bargained
share of surplus may always or sometimes suce to satisfy the NSC, depending on parameters.
62.2 The productivity processes
After the creation of a match, its productivity is exposed to shocks. Shocks to the
idiosyncratic productivity component arrive at the Poisson rate . The new values
of x are i.i.d. draws from a distribution F with support [x;  x] and density f. For
simplicity, we assume F is uniform, so that f(x) = ( x   x) 1 on [x;  x].9 Moreover, for
the moment we assume newly-formed rm-worker pairs start to produce at the top of
the distribution, with x =  x. The alternative of random initial match productivity is
dened in Appendix B, and is one of the cases simulated in Section 5.
The shocks to the common component y represent exogenous uctuations in aggre-
gate labor productivity. By assumption, y follows a Markov chain across N distinct
states yi, for i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng, ordered with y1 denoting the lowest and yN the highest
possible realization. New draws arrive at Poisson rate , and the conditional proba-
bility of moving from yi to yj is denoted by Gyjjyi: The Markov transition matrix can









where column j lists the probabilities of the N possible successors of state yj, implying
that each column sums to one. We assume that G is irreducible (so for all i and j, yi
can eventually be reached from yj), and that the matrix 1
2(I + G) exhibits rst-order
stochastic dominance.10
In equilibrium, suciently bad shocks to x or y will give rise to endogenous sepa-
rations. In addition, we assume that matches separate for exogenous reasons at rate
. All separations are permanent and there is no recall of previous oers.
2.3 Matching
Unemployed workers meet vacant jobs through a random matching technology. The
gross rate of meetings at time t, mt, is given by
mt = M(ut;vt) (2)
where ut is the mass of unemployed, vt is the mass of vacancies, and M is a constant-
returns function. Therefore, a worker's probability of nding a matching opportunity,
9A uniform distribution is not essential; see our earlier working paper version.
10This assumption guarantees that the transitions of y from one moment to the next, which are
governed by (1   dt)I + Gdt, exhibit rst-order stochastic dominance.






















so that p(t) = tq(t).
2.4 The value of matching
We now state the Bellman equations that summarize match values for workers and
rms. For the moment we impose two restrictions on the equilibrium that are known
to be valid in related models (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Cole and Rogerson
1999). First, we assume that aggregate jump variables may depend on y and that
match-specic jump variables may depend on x and y, but that neither depends on
other state variables, like the unemployment rate or the cross-sectional distribution of
productivity in existing jobs. Second, we assume rms follow a reservation strategy,
summarized by an N-dimensional vector of reservation productivities R, with individ-
ual elements Ri  R(yi). In other words, in aggregate state yi only jobs with x  Ri
survive; the rest are destroyed. In Sections 4 and 5 we prove by construction that
equilibria of this form exist.
We rst write the Bellman equations under the assumption that workers never
shirk; later we derive the NSC that guarantees this. Call the bargained wage w(x;y)
and let the value functions of employed and unemployed workers be W(x;y) and U(y),
respectively. For any pair (x;y) in the set C(R)  f(x;yi) : x  Rig, which we will call
the continuation region of a match, the function W must satisfy:





















This equation states that the ow of returns for a matched worker includes the wage
plus several ows of expected capital gains and losses: possible losses from separation
at rate , the gains from new idiosyncratic productivity draws x0 at rate , and the
gains from aggregate shocks that change the common productivity component from y
to y0 at rate Gy0jy. Conditional on an idiosyncratic shock, the separation probability
8is F(R(y)), while aggregate shocks cause separation whenever x lies below the new
reservation productivity R(y0).
Unemployed workers obtain a ow payo b from leisure and meet vacant rms at
rate p((y)): The asset value of an unemployed worker, U(y), thus satises:





0)   U(y)] (6)
where NW(y) is the worker's expected value gain from a new job oer. Since we assume
for now that new jobs are drawn from the top of the job distribution, the gain is
N
W(y) = W( x;y)   U(y) (7)
and new jobs are always accepted in a nontrivial equilibrium.
Now consider the value functions associated with vacancies, V (y), and lled jobs,
J(x;y). Inside the continuation region, the value of a lled job satises the following
Bellman equation:





















which has an interpretation analogous to that of (5).
We assume that maintaining a vacancy costs c per unit of time. Accordingly, for
each possible y, the value of a vacancy must satisfy:





0)   V (y)] (9)
where q((y)) is the matching rate for vacant jobs and NF(y) is a rm's expected
increase in value upon matching. Since new jobs come from the top of the productivity
distribution, we have
N
F(y) = J( x;y)   V (y): (10)
Lastly, we assume rms create jobs until the rents from vacant positions are exhausted,
so at any moment in time
V (y) = 0: (11)
9Next, we dene match surplus as S(x;y)  J(x;y)+W(x;y) U(y) V (y). Sum-
ming the previous Bellman equations and simplifying, we can derive the Bellman equa-
tion for the match surplus:11













The division of this match surplus is determined in bilateral negotiations subject to
the no-shirking condition of workers.
2.4.1 The no-shirking condition
To derive the NSC, note that a rational worker will never shirk in state (x;y) if the
gain from shirking during a brief interval dt is less than the expected cost of a layo
in case of detection. The logic also works in the opposite direction. If it pays to shirk
for a short time dt in state (x;y), then workers will always shirk in that state.
Formally, let W s(x;y) denote the value function of a worker who shirks during an
interval dt and who plans to exert eort thereafter. Using (5), we can express the
dierence between W s(x;y) and W(x;y) as
r[W
s(x;y)   W(x;y)] = bdt + 'dt[U(y)   W(x;y)] + o(dt) (13)
where o(dt) is a term that becomes negligible compared to dt as dt ! 0: Dividing by
dt and taking the limit as dt ! 0, we nd that workers never shirk in state (x;y) if12




This condition needs to be satised at each point in time, as long as the match contin-
ues, since we assume away temporary layos.13 Finally, note that executing the threat
to re an observed shirker (o the equilibrium path) is an equilibrium strategy for the
rm if failing to do so would cause all other workers to shirk. From the workers' view-
point, this response is also an equilibrium strategy, because individual workers have
11See our previous working paper version for some of the algebraic details.
12Note that in the NSC, the levels of shirking utility and monitoring frequency are irrelevant; only
their ratio b=' matters. Therefore there is no loss of generality in our assumption that the leisure
derived from shirking is the same as the leisure derived from unemployment.
13Alternatively, we could rule out temporary layos endogenously by by introducing a suciently
large maintenance cost for laid-o jobs. For an analysis of moral hazard in a model where temporary
layos occur in equilibrium but endogenous separation does not, see Park (2007).
10no way to prove that they are not shirking when all other workers stop exerting eort
(recall that the fraction of time a rm observes any given worker's eort is negligible).
Thus, eort is sustained by two credible trigger strategies: rms' threat to re shirkers,
and the threat of a rm-wide breakdown of discipline if any shirker is not red.
2.5 Wages and turnover
We are now ready to describe the wage bargain and rms' turnover decisions. We make
two strong but helpful assumptions about bargaining. First, we assume the bargaining
outcome can be revised continuously at no cost on the initiative of the rm and/or the
worker. This means that the wage must solve a bargaining game at all points in time,
eliminating any indeterminacy about the time path of labor income.14 Second, in the
spirit of Barro (1977), we assume the rm and the worker play the equilibrium of their
bilateral game that is jointly optimal, thus eliminating any indeterminacy about the
result of their game. In the next section we show that this assumption makes sense|
that is, given the behavior of the rest of the economy, there exists an equilibrium of
the game played by a given worker-rm pair which both prefer to any other. Note that
we are not assuming optimality at the aggregate level: we are simply ruling out the
possibility that a given pair separate because they fail to recognize a feasible way to
improve both their payos through renegotiation.
Subject to these assumptions, match surplus is shared through incentive-constrained




subject to (14). In equilibrium, the surplus of a worker therefore satises
W(x;y)   U(y) = max[S(x;y);b='] (16)
where  2 (0;1) measures the relative bargaining strength of the worker. This wage rule
can be derived as the perfect equilibrium of an alternating oer game (e.g. Rocheteau
2001). It has the desirable feature that the moral hazard problem only aects wage
setting if the worker's threat of shirking is credible. Whenever this is the case, the
14As in Macleod and Malcomson (1989), allowing either party to restart negotiation at any time
eliminates the possibility of upfront or delayed transfers from one party to the other, because these
would be made ineectual by renegotiation. (Their paper obtained this result by assuming continuous
renegotiation and constant default payos; in our case it is a result of continuous renegotiation and
constant bargaining shares.)
11rm has two options: to raise the wage until the NSC is satised, or to sever the
relationship. Hence, in an ongoing relationship a rm's surplus satises
J(x;y) = min[(1   )S(x;y);S(x;y)   b='], (17)
and a necessary condition for match continuation is
S(x;y)  b='. (18)
3 Analysis
This section addresses several theoretical issues we have to understand in order to com-
pute our model. First, we show that there is a unique bilaterally-optimal reservation
policy for any rm-worker pair. Therefore it is meaningful to invoke the Barro (1977)
argument that pairs will only separate if it is jointly optimal to do so. Thereafter,
we describe the optimal surplus function and separation behavior and dene general
equilibrium. Readers who wish to skip these technical issues may jump to Section 4,
where we solve the simpler case of just two aggregate states.
3.1 Partial equilibrium
Some previous papers have argued that match surplus sharing under an incentive
compatibility constraint may not pin down a unique bargain (Den Haan et al. 1999;
Mortensen and Pissarides 1999). The intuition is simple. For given aggregate labor
market conditions, workers' match surplus depends negatively on the anticipated layo
rate. Hence, if workers expect a rise in job destruction, a higher wage will be required
to ensure eort, but this reduces prots and so rms may choose to re more fre-
quently, validating workers' expectations. Thus, the non-cooperative choice of eort
and reservation thresholds creates scope for multiple equilibria.
However, contrary to appearances, this potential multiplicity relates to partial equi-
librium, not to general equilibrium. That is, it arises in the game played by a specic
rm-worker pair, taking as given aggregate market conditions. Moreover, we will now
show that for any aggregate conditions ;NW 2 RN
+, there exists a unique bilateral
equilibrium reservation policy which the pair jointly prefers.
To analyze the pair's separation behavior, we must look beyond Bellman equations
(5)-(12), which only describe values inside the continuation region C(R). Instead, we
now calculate the value T of continuing in an arbitrary state (x;y)| possibly outside of
12C(R)| until the next aggregate or idiosyncratic shock occurs.15 To be precise, suppose
that after any change in x or y, the worker and rm expect to follow a given reservation
strategy R, and they expect the value of their match to be S(x;y), where S is a given
non-negative function, weakly increasing in x and dened for x  x. Then the value
of staying together temporarily can be calculated from (12) as follows:16
T(x;y;S;R;;N
W)  (r +  +  + )
 1 













Incentive compatibility remains satised as long as T(x;y;S;R;;NW) is at least
equal to b='. But note that T itself depends on the reservation strategy R. Therefore,
given any candidate R, we can calculate a new reservation strategy e R as follows:
e R(y) = minfx  x : T(x;y;S;R;;N
W)  b='g: (20)
The true reservation strategy associated with a given surplus function S must be a
xed point of the mapping (20). We show in Appendix C that under weak regularity
conditions, a xed point exists; moreover, there is an unambiguously lowest xed point.
Like R, we can also think of the surplus S as the solution to a xed point problem.
Inside C(R), surplus equals T; outside, by denition, it is zero. But T depends on S.
Therefore given any candidate S, we can dene a new surplus function e S as follows:17
e S(x;y) =

0 for x < R(y)
T(x;y;S;R;;NW) for x 2 [R(y);1) (21)
The surplus function must be a xed point of (21). The following proposition shows
that there is a unique xed point of (21) which maximizes surplus; associated with it is
a unique, lowest possible vector of reservation productivities. In other words, for any
aggregate conditions, there is a unique reservation strategy that is jointly optimal for
the worker-rm pair.
15Echoing arguments from Section 2.4.1, the pair prefers to continue for an arbitrary length of time
in state (x;y) if and only if they prefer to continue in state (x;y) for a brief interval dt. So there is
no need to consider any o-equilibrium deviations other than the one analyzed here.
16Since for now we are only considering the partial equilibrium behavior of an individual pair, we
do not yet impose mutual consistency between S and R and  and NW.
17It is convenient to dene S for x  x, even though these values of x never occur, because this
ensures that the \min" in (20) is always well-dened.
13Proposition 1. For any ;NW 2 RN
+, there exists a unique pair S and R such that:
1. R is a xed point of (20) given surplus function S.
2. S is a xed point of (21) given reservation vector R.
3. If there exists another xed point (S0;R0) of (20)-(21), then R(y)  R0(y) and
S(x;y)  S0(x;y) for all x and y.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The proof of Proposition 1 adapts Rustichini's (1998) method for problems with
incentive constraints to address the bounding of R and S simultaneously.18 It con-
structs a monotone sequence Sj, for j 2 f0;1;2;:::g, by iterating on (21). The initial
function S0 is weakly increasing in x and y. Mapping (21) obviously preserves mono-
tonicity in x, strengthening it to strict monotonicity on C(R). Given our rst-order
stochastic dominance assumption for y, (21) also preserves monotonicity in y as long
as x + y   b   p((y))NW(y) is strictly increasing in y, meaning that for all i,
yi+1   p((yi+1))N
W(yi+1) > yi   p((yi))N
W(yi). (22)
Finally, since the monotonicity properties of S are preserved at each step j, they
also hold in the limit, and this implies that the limiting reservation productivities are
increasing in y. Therefore we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Suppose that ;NW 2 RN
+ satisfy (22). Then the jointly optimal xed
point pair (S;R) of (20)-(21) has the following properties:
1. Function S is strictly increasing in x for x 2 [R(y);x]:
2. Function S is weakly increasing in y.
3. The vector of reservation productivities R is weakly decreasing in y.
From here on, we will assume that (22) holds. Hence, arranging the reservation
productivities in ascending order we can write
RN+1  RN  :::  R1  R0 (23)
where we have dened RN+1  x and R0  x. Using this notation we can divide the
support of x into N + 1 (possibly empty) intervals of the form Ii  [Ri;Ri 1), plus an
upper \interval" I0  fxg that contains newly created jobs. The monotonicity of the
reservation productivities implies that jobs with x 2 Ii survive as long as y  yi:
18In the absence of moral hazard, existence of a unique solution to the Bellman equation for the
surplus function can be proved using the contraction mapping theorem. But here, the discontinuity
in mapping (21) means that it fails to be a contraction.
143.2 Characterizing the surplus function
Next, we characterize the solution to (12), noting that the the surplus function is
piecewise linear, with jumps at the endpoints of the intervals dened in (23).
Inside the intervals Ii, equation (12) permits us to dierentiate the surplus function
with respect to x:
(r +  +  + )
@S(x;y)
@x







Notice that this equation contains just one value of x. Therefore, the equations on any
segment Ii can be solved independently from those on all the other segments, and the
possible existence of empty segments is irrelevant for the solution. The equations for




















where I is an identity matrix of order N + 1   i and Gi is the matrix formed from
rows and columns j  i of G (that is, the last N   i + 1 rows and columns of G). An
inspection of (25) demonstrates that for each i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng, the surplus function
S(x;yi) gets steeper as x approaches the top of the productivity distribution. The
reason is that jobs with high realizations of x are relatively stable over the cycle. By
contrast, jobs in the interval IN are destroyed after any negative shock, so the revenues
from these fragile jobs are discounted at a higher rate.
The fact that the slope of S increases as we move right across intervals Ii is a stan-
dard property of models with endogenous separations. The novel feature introduced
by moral hazard is the presence of discontinuities in the surplus function. As equation
(21) shows, surplus S(x;yi) must be discontinuous at x = Ri because an innitesimal
reduction in x would make the match unsustainable, implying a loss of at least b='.
Moreover, the prospect of future inecient separations also causes a jump at Ri in all
higher states yj  yi. The size of these \secondary" jumps depends on the probability
that the economy will enter aggregate state i at some point in the future.
To be more precise, for any i and j dene the jump in the surplus function S(x;yj)
at x = Ri as
(Ri;yj)  lim
dx!0
S(Ri + dx;yj)   S(Ri   dx;yj):
If there is continuation on both sides of Ri in state j, we can use (12) to calculate the
following formula for the jump:





15Since (Ri;yi)  b=' and G is irreducible, (26) implies that the jumps (Ri;yj) at
points in the interior of C(R) are nonzero as long as there is moral hazard (that is, as
long as b=' > 0).
Next, consider the jump in surplus associated with a marginal job, (Ri;yi). Bear-
ing in mind our assumption that matched pairs play their jointly optimal equilibrium,
two things may occur at the reservation productivity Ri for any state i. First, suppose
the segment Ii = [Ri;Ri 1) is non-empty. Then the jump in S(x;yi) at x = Ri cannot
exceed b=', because if it did, the rm and worker would benet from continuing at some
strictly lower productivity x   dx, and could do so without violating the NSC (recall
that T(x;yi;S;R;;NW) is continuous everywhere except at the reservation productiv-
ities). On the contrary, if the segment Ii is empty, then the surplus of the marginal job
can exceed b='. The possibility of an empty interval arises because S(x;yi) is discontin-
uous at Ri 1, so there may be a situation in which T(Ri 1 +dx;yi;S;R;;NW) > b='
while T(Ri 1   dx;yi;S;R;;NW) < b=' for any arbitrarily small value of dx. In
this case the reservation productivities of states i and i   1 collapse, Ri = Ri 1. The
reason is that in state i, jobs with productivity marginally less than Ri 1 would be too
short-lived to generate a surplus of at least b='.
In sum, it cannot be the case that (Ri;yi) exceeds b=' when Ri is distinct from
Ri 1, a fact which can be summarized as a set of N complementary slackness conditions:







Equivalently, we can combine (27) with the match surplus equation (12), to obtain the
















with equality if i = 1 or if Ri < Ri 1 strictly.
3.3 General equilibrium
So far, we have analyzed the behavior of a matched pair as a function of the produc-
tivities (x;y). To dene general equilibrium, it suces to ensure that tightness and
the value of searching for new jobs are consistent with the representative pair's surplus
function and continuation behavior:
16Denition 1. A no-shirking equilibrium can be summarized by a surplus function
S(x;y), a vector R of reservation productivities, a tightness vector , and a vector of
new job values NW that satisfy the following conditions:
1. For each y, the surplus function satises (12) for x 2 [R(y);x], and S(x;y) = 0
for x 2 [x;R(y)).
2. For each y, the surplus function satises the job destruction condition (28) at the
reservation productivity R(y).
3. Labor market tightness (y) and the new job value NW() are given by
c = q((y))minf(1   )S(x;y);S(x;y)   b='g; (29)
N
W(y) = maxfS(x;y);b='g: (30)
To calculate equilibrium we solve a root-nding problem to nd numbers dRi and dSi,
for i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng, consistent with this denition. See Appendix A for details.
Finally, after calculating S; NW,  and R, it is straightforward to simulate employ-
ment and productivity dynamics because (y) and R(y) jump immediately to their new
equilibrium values each time a shock hits the economy. Formally, let et(Ii) denote the
measure of employed workers with productivity in the set Ii at time t and let et = 1 ut
denote total employment. These employment aggregates evolve as follows:19
det(I0) = p((yt))utdt   et(I0)dt (31)
det(Ii) =

[(F(Ri)   F(Ri 1))et   et(Ii)]dt when yt+dt  yi
  et(Ii) when yt+dt < yi
(32)




where we have dropped all terms negligible relative to dt. Equation (31) denes the
evolution of the mass of jobs in the top productivity interval I0. Over a brief interval dt,
the economy creates p((yt))utdt new jobs, and the outow from I0 is et(I0)dt: These
jobs continue if they draw a new x satisfying x  R(y), and are destroyed otherwise.
The mass of continuing jobs evolves according to (32). In the absence of aggregate
shocks the mass et(Ii) evolves smoothly towards a conditional steady state, but et(Ii)
drops abruptly to zero if the aggregate productivity component falls below yi.
19We briey abuse notation by subscripting y in an inconsistent but hopefully transparent way.
174 Example: two aggregate states
Worker moral hazard can be expected to distort both the hiring and separation margins;
shortly we will quantify its eects in an example calibrated for the U.S. But before
moving to the numerical analysis, we want to anticipate some of these eects in a







We set  = 0, so there are only endogenous separations, and assume that new jobs
start at the top of the distribution, with productivity x.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) showed that an economy of this type generates
counter-cyclical uctuations in job destruction when eort is perfectly observable. By
continuity, this will still be true in the presence of a small amount of moral hazard.
Hence, rms will have a core of stable jobs (with x 2 [R1;x)) that survive through
booms and recessions, and in a boom they will also build up a fringe of fragile jobs
(with x 2 [R2;R1)) which will be destroyed when the economy enters a recession.
4.1 Two states: calculating the surplus function
From Section 3.2 we know that the surplus function is piecewise linear, with slopes given
by (25). If there is no moral hazard problem, so that b=' = 0, then the surplus function
is continuous, as illustrated in Figure 2a; this is the model analyzed by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). With moral hazard, there are also discontinuities at the reservation
productivities, given by formula (26). Simplifying (25) and (26), we can state the






















' for x 2 [R1;x]
(35)
Fig. 2b illustrates this discontinuous surplus function (it reduces to Fig. 2a if b=' = 0).
In recessions the surplus has slope 1
r+. In contrast, in booms it has slope 1
r++ to the
left of R1 and 1
r+ to the right of R1. Intuitively, a marginal increase in idiosyncratic
productivity x is less valuable in the interval of \fragile" jobs, because the match is
not expected to last so long as it would if it lay in the \stable" interval.
18Table 1: Firing rates and surplus ows required by NSC (assuming R2 < R1)
Fragile jobs Stable jobs
Recessions
Current ring rate 1 F(R1)
Expected ring rate n.a. F(R1)
Required surplus ow n.a. (r + F(R1))b='
Booms
Current ring rate F(R2) F(R2)
Expected ring rate  + F(R2) F(R1)
Required surplus ow (r +  + F(R2))b=' (r + F(R2))b='
According to (35), the jump in the surplus function for booms, S(x;y2), that occurs









which is the expected loss of surplus associated with separation in case of a future re-
cession. However, this jump formula depends only on the degree of moral hazard, not
on the productivity dierence between booms and recessions. Therefore, (35) cannot
be satised under all conceivable parameter values, and a dierent equilibrium con-
guration will arise as moral hazard increases, in which the reservation productivities
collapse to a single value. At R1, in order to have R2 < R1 strictly, it must be the
case that S(x;y2)   S(x;y1) 
b='
r++. Otherwise, if booms cause only a small upward
shift in the surplus function (small relative to the degree of moral hazard, b
'), rms
will nd it unprotable to maintain workers with x < R1 in booms. This possibility is
illustrated in Figure 2c.
4.2 Two states: characterizing uctuations in separation
The possibility that the reservation productivities may collapse in the presence of moral
hazard arises because workers in fragile jobs are particularly hard to motivate. To see
this, consider Table 1, which compares separation rates across various situations, and
analyzes their implications for the wage required to prevent shirking.
As the table shows, current ring rates are higher in recessions for all jobs than
they are in booms. Fragile jobs separate immediately in recessions (indicated as an
innite ring rate in the table), and while the recession continues stable jobs separate
at rate F(R1), which is at least as high as the separation rate in booms, F(R2),
since R2  R1. However, what matters for incentives is the expected rate of ring,
taking into account the fact that the state may change. For fragile jobs in booms the
19expected ring rate is +F(R2), which factors in the rate  at which booms end. In
contrast, for marginal jobs in recessions the expected rate of ring equals the current
rate F(R1), regardless of .
This dierence in expected ring rates aects the no-shirking condition, which says
that workers must expect to earn b=' above the value of unemployment over the life
of their jobs. In ow terms this means the wage must be high enough to generate
the per-period ows of surplus shown in the bottom row of each section of the table.
Note that if  is close to zero, the required surplus ow in marginal jobs is higher in
recessions than in booms (because F(R1)  F(R2)). This makes marginal workers
more expensive in recessions, which raises R1 even further relative to R2. Therefore,
when   0, including moral hazard in the model makes separation more variable, by
causing a larger wave of ring at the start of any recession.
However, when  is suciently large, this argument is reversed. In particular, for
  (F(R1) F(R2)), the expected duration of marginal jobs is shorter in booms than
in recessions. This forces rms to pay marginal workers a higher ow surplus in booms,
encouraging them to re more in booms, and thus tends to make the dierence in the
reservation productivities smaller. In fact, when  is suciently large relative to other
parameters, rms will raise R2 until it coincides with R1. Then the separation rate will
be constant over the cycle; there will no longer be any fragile jobs, and there will be
no burst of ring when a recession occurs. In Appendix D, we perform a comparative
statics analysis of R2  R1 in terms of y2  y1 to derive the following criterion for time
variation in the separation rate.
Proposition 2. Consider the two-state case, assuming y2   y1 is small, and that b='
is small enough so that S(x;yi)  b=' for each i. Then R2 cannot be strictly less
than R1 unless the following inequality is satised:
b='
r +  + 
<
y2   y1
r + F(R) + q=(1   )
Thus, separation varies countercyclically if the transition rate from booms to re-
cessions is low relative to the productivity dierence between booms and recessions,
or if there is no moral hazard; otherwise it collapses to a constant rate.20 This way
in which moral hazard decreases the volatility of separation is obviously missed by
any analysis that considers steady states only. It is also absent in the discrete-time
model of Ramey and Watson (1997), because they assume idiosyncratic shocks have
no persistence, which means no jobs are more `fragile' than any others.
20The fact that we are assuming only two aggregate states is not essential for this result, because the
calculation just involves comparing the probability of transition between two neighboring aggregate
states with the productivity gap between those states. A similar argument can be made about the
possible collapse of two or more neighboring reservation thresholds when there are many aggregate
states, and even as we go to the limit of a continuous aggregate productivity distribution.
20Table 2: Fluctuations in workers' initial surplus share
Constant shares Countercyclical worker share Rent rigidity
b=' < S(x;y1) S(x;y1) < b=' < S(x;y2) S(x;y2) < b='
Worker share (recessions) S(x;y1) b=' b='
Worker share (booms) S(x;y2) S(x;y2) b='
Amplication of hiring? No Yes Yes
4.3 Two states: characterizing uctuations in hiring
By raising the reservation thresholds, the NSC decreases the expected duration of all
jobs. Therefore it decreases match surplus, and hiring incentives, both in recessions
and booms. But the degree to which hiring is reduced varies over time, especially
since the NSC causes surplus shares to vary with the cycle. Table 2 shows how our
current example, with two aggregate states and new jobs at the top of the distribution,
generates three possible sharing regimes for the surplus of new jobs.
In the zero moral hazard case of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), workers obtain a
constant share  of initial match surplus. By continuity, this remains true for a small
degree of moral hazard b='. As moral hazard increases, the NSC may eventually bind in
new jobs. Since surplus is monotonic in y, the NSC must bind on new jobs in recessions
before booms, that is, S(x;y1) < b=' < S(x;y2), which implies that newly hired
workers will receive an eciency wage in recessions and a bargained wage in booms.
This makes worker's surplus share countercyclical, and rms' share procyclical. Finally,
moral hazard may be so severe that new jobs receive an eciency wage even in booms,
S(x;y2) < b=', which requires rms to pay workers the same rent b=' in recessions
and booms,21 and makes rms' surplus share even more procyclical than the previous
case. Thus in the last two cases, moral hazard tends to amplify uctuations in job
creation: rms prot more from hiring in booms both because aggregate productivity
is higher and because they receive a higher share of match surplus.
4.4 Two states: wage compression
Another way moral hazard aects newly-created jobs is by compressing wages across
those jobs, as we now show. We have emphasized how a binding NSC truncates the
wage distribution from below, to maintain surplus at or above b='. But in fact, the
NSC implies a degree of wage rigidity even when it is not binding. The reason is simple:
in their initial negotiations, workers and rms foresee the possibility that the NSC will
21Bruggemann and Moscarini (2007) have referred to this extreme case as `rent rigidity'.
21bind in the future. When it binds, the worker's share of the ow proceeds will exceed
, so these redistributive eects must be undone during the initial negotiations.
To see this, let b xi denote idiosyncratic productivity level at which S(b xi;yi) = b='.
Assuming for a moment that  = 0, and that b xi < x for i = 1;2, we can derive the
following expression for initial wages:







The rst two terms represent the bargained wage in the absence of moral hazard, and
the last term is an implicit transfer from the worker to the rm which compensates for
the fact that the the worker will earn more than S(x;yi) whenever x falls below b xi.
This shows that the NSC compresses the cross-sectional wage distribution, for a
given aggregate state. But the wage distribution is also compressed over time by a
similar mechanism. For example, suppose that S(x;y1) < b=' < S(x;y2), the case













This equation shows that the worker makes two implicit transfers to the rm. As
before, the integral term is a transfer which serves to compensate the rm for the
possibility that may x fall below b x2 in the future. The last term is a transfer that
compensates the rm for the fact that it will need to pay the worker an eciency wage
if the economy enters into a recession.
5 Calibrated results
Section 4 showed that moral hazard amplies hiring volatility by causing time variation
in rms' share of surplus, and that it aects the volatility of separation in an ambiguous
way, depending on the size and frequency of aggregate shocks. We now wish to look
at these eects quantitatively, and explore how all margins of labor market volatility
are aected by moral hazard when the model is calibrated to U.S. data.
5.1 Data and calibration
Relevant moments from U.S. data are reported in Table 3. The series for unemployment
(u), vacancies (v), and average productivity ( y) are taken from the FRED database;
22Table 3: Summary statistics, quarterly U.S. data, 1951:1-2006:2
u v  p s y
Mean 0.0565 0.0610 0.926 1.350 0.0808 |
Standard deviation 0.193 0.197 0.374 0.164 0.0667 0.0164
Autocorrelation 0.941 0.945 0.946 0.910 0.623 0.864
Correlations
u 1 -0.886 -0.958 -0.946 0.577 -0.259
v | 1 0.976 0.920 -0.536 0.170
 | | 1 0.962 -0.581 0.202
p | | | 1 -0.461 0.194
s | | | | 1 -0.421
y | | | | | 1
tightness is  = v=u.22 The data on the probability of job nding (p) and separation
(s) are the series used in Shimer (2007).23 To compute the second moments the data
are logged and HP ltered with a smoothing parameter of 105, as in Shimer (2005).
The recent debate on labor market volatility mainly stresses the cyclical behavior
of the job nding rate p and the unemployment rate u. In the data p is roughly
10 times as volatile as productivity, and uctuations in p explain a large part of the
uctuations in u. Like p, vacancies v are also very volatile and strongly negatively
correlated with unemployment. Nonetheless, Table 3 clearly indicates that the job
nding rate is not the only relevant margin of adjustment. The rate at which workers
enter unemployment, s, is more than 4 times as volatile as y and is negatively correlated
with p and y. In line with this evidence, Fujita and Ramey (2009) estimate that job
destruction accounts for at least a third of the uctuations in u.
With exogenous separation, it is straightforward to identify the matching param-
eters from the means of various labor market ows. Calibration is more dicult if
separation is assumed to be driven by match-specic productivity shocks, so that labor
ows depend on the parameters of the shock processes in complex ways. Where we
cannot calculate parameters directly from observables, our calibration strategy largely
follows that of Pissarides (2007).
22The unemployment series is UNRATE, the unemployment rate of persons aged 16 and over, which
has mean u = 0:0565 in our sample; the vacancy series is HELPWANT, the Conference Board's series
of help-wanted advertising; and productivity is OPHNFB, output per hour in nonfarm business. The
series were downloaded from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
23Robert Shimer (2007) pointed out that it is important to correct for time aggregation bias when
calculating transition probabilities from data on unemployment stocks. We use the corrected series
that he constructed. The data from June 1967 and December 1975 were tabulated by Joe Ritter and
made available by Hoyt Bleakley. For additional details, please see Shimer (2007) and his webpage
http://robert.shimer.googlepages.com/ows.
23Our targets for , p, s and u come directly from Shimer's data. In his series, mean
matching rates for workers and jobs are p = 1:35 and q = 1:25 per quarter, so mean
tightness is   p=q = 0:9259. The mean rate at which employed workers separate
is s = 0:0808 per quarter. Shimer also pointed out that if matching has constant
returns, and all new jobs are accepted, then regressing the job nding rate on tightness
gives the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies. In our data this coecient
is 0:42, so for the matching function mt = m0vt
1 u
t we need  = 0:58, and we can
deduce m0 from p = m0()1 . We then parameterize bargaining so that Hosios'
eciency condition is satised in the absence of moral hazard,  = .
Our model postulates both an exogenous separation rate  and an endogenous rate
F(R). Findings in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, Chap. 2.5) oer a possible
way to separate these two components. In their quarterly data, job reallocations rep-
resent only 32%-53% of worker reallocations (and they cite other studies of matched
worker-rm data in which this fraction is roughly 40%). Since vacancies are lled
quickly, they argue that quarterly changes in a rm's workforce must mainly reect
changes in its demand for labor, rather than workers' responses to individual factors.
We feel that the idiosyncratic productivity variations in our model are best interpreted
as changes in rms' need for specic types of labor, and we therefore map the frac-
tion of endogenous separations into the ratio of job reallocation to worker reallocation.
Taking this to be 40%, we have  = 0:6s and F(R) = 0:4s.
No more parameters can be inferred directly from observed steady state labor mar-
ket ows. In particular, endogenous separation is the product of  and F(R), neither
of which is easily observable. We nish the calibration following Pissarides (2007), who
assumes idiosyncratic shocks are uniformly distributed and arrive at a quarterly rate of









Also, Pissarides uses Hall's (2006) calibration that the worker's cost of labor b is 71%
of average productivity, which requires24
b = 0:71
1 +  + R
2
(38)
assuming that the aggregate shock process y has mean zero.
24Here we compute b as a fraction of the average x after a job is hit by a shock. This measures
average productivity exactly if the initial productivity of a job is drawn from F. When jobs start
at the top of the distribution, as we assume here, average productivity is a weighted average of the
productivity of new and continuing jobs, but the dierence is small for realistic parameter values.
24Table 4: Calibrated parameters for the U.S.: ecient benchmark
Parameter Value Source
moral hazard b=' 0 Eciency
matching parameter mo 1.394 CPS; Shimer (2005)
matching elasticity  0.580 CPS; Shimer (2005)
tightness  0.926 CPS; Shimer (2005)
bargaining power  0.580 Hosios condition
leisure value b 0.720 Hall (2005); calibrated
exogenous destruction rate  0.048 CPS; Davis et al. (1996)
risk free rate r 0.010
vacancy cost c 0.217 calibrated
uniform distribution F [x   x]=[x   x]
domain [x   x] [0.948,1.052] calibrated
arrival rate  0.100 Pissarides (2007)
arrival rate  1 normalization
Our parameterization must also be consistent with the job creation and job destruc-








in steady state. Using this surplus function, the productivity ^ x at which the NSC just
starts to bind is given by
^ x = min

1 + ;R +
1   






Then, using the fact that w0(x) =  for all x  ^ x, and assuming new jobs start with




(1   )(1 + ) + ^ x   R
r +  + 
(39)
Likewise, the reservation threshold R must satisfy the job destruction condition.












1 +    R
r +  + 

if jobs start with maximum productivity. The job destruction condition is then
R = b + pN





r +  + 
(1   F(R))
2 (40)
Plugging in ^ x and pNW, equations (37)-(40) jointly determine , b, c, and R condi-
tional on , b=', and the interest rate r. We initially calibrate the model abstracting
25Table 5: Simulated moments: ecient benchmark calibration
Variable
u v  p s y
Mean 0.0595 0.0548 0.9260 1.2751 0.0806 |
Standard deviation 0.0751 0.0351 0.0561 0.0223 0.0798 0.0172
Autocorrelation 0.722 0.416 0.850 0.851 0.268 0.845
Correlations
u 1 0.697 -0.889 -0.884 0.758 -0.891
v | 1 -0.307 -0.299 0.662 -0.312
 | | 1 0.994 -0.588 0.995
p | | | 1 -0.559 0.992
s | | | | 1 -0.597
y | | | | | 1
from moral hazard (b=' = 0), and then explore how it behaves as we raise b='. Table
4 shows the implied parameterization if we set quarterly rates r = 0:01 and  = 0:1 (as
in Pissarides, 2007). Finally, to match the standard deviation and quarterly autocorre-
lation of our U.S. labor productivity data we set  to one and we assume that y takes
nine evenly-spaced discrete values spanning plus or minus two standard deviations,
setting the probabilities by Tauchen's method.
5.2 Results
In Table 5 we report the implications of our ecient benchmark model for the same
moments shown in Table 3.25 As can be seen, the shocks to y generate roughly 40%
of the observed volatility in unemployment. However, the separation rate is more
volatile than in the data, whereas uctuations in p account only for 13:6% of the
observed volatility in the job nding rate. Hence, a disproportionately large share of
the uctuations in u are driven by changes in the job destruction rate.26
An even more striking failure of the benchmark model is its prediction for the
correlation between unemployment and vacancies. In the data these variables have a
strong negative contemporaneous correlation, (with an even stronger correlation be-
tween vacancies and the one-quarter lag of unemployment, not shown in the table).
25Since the model is dened in continuous time, the simulations are performed with short periods
(two weeks) after an appropriate rescaling of the parameters. Simulation results in Tables 5-11 are
generated by simulating 1000 histories of 240 quarters, discarding the rst 40 quarters, so that the
remaining 200 quarters correspond roughly to the length of the U.S. post-war period.
26Mortensen and Nagyp al (2007b) report similar results. They also obtain a countercyclical vacancy
rate but they do not discuss the implications for the Beveridge curve correlation.
26Our model instead generates a strong positive contemporaneous Beveridge correlation.
As explained in previous studies, this counterfactual result is due to a so-called \echo
eect" (e.g. Fujita, 2004). The spike in ut at the start of a recession immediately
causes a spike in vt since the large inow into unemployment makes it easy for rms
to locate workers. Furthermore, the model generates much less persistence in ut and
vt than is observed in the data.
While our one-shock model generates an excessive correlation between the job nd-
ing probability and productivity, its search and matching setup does a good job with
the negative correlation between job nding and separation. It is particularly success-
ful in predicting that separation leads job nding by one quarter. In the data the
negative correlation between separation and job nding increases from -0.461 contem-
poraneously to -0.602 with a one-period lead in separation; in the model it increases
from -0.559 to -0.664 (only the contemporaneous correlations are shown in the table).
Eects of worker moral hazard in the benchmark economy
We now study the eects of a gradual increase in b=' when all other parameters are
held constant at their benchmark values. The results are reported in Table 6. The rst
two columns contain the data for the U.S. and our ecient benchmark and in the rest
of the table we report a subset of moments for ve increasing degrees of moral hazard.
The values of b=' are chosen so that they span all the surplus sharing cases described
in Table 2, from constant shares to `rent rigidity'.
Theoretically, Section 4 suggested that introducing moral hard might amplify or
smooth the cyclical uctuations in separation. But this calibration exercise sug-
gests that the overwhelming quantitative eect of moral hazard is to make separation
smoother. The log standard deviation s decreases monotonically as we raise b=', and
beyond a value of 0.05 rms choose the same reservation productivity in all nine aggre-
gate states, so that the separation rate is constant. On the other hand, the standard
deviations of p and u follow an inverted-U pattern in response to the changes in b='.
The initial reduction in p reects the losses from inecient churning which is more
intense in good states than in bad states. The reason that the volatility of p picks up
suddenly in the last column is that at this level of moral hazard, job creation is driven
by the NSC in all nine states. Hence, the data reported in the last column correspond
to an eciency wage model in which the workers earn a constant rent b=' in all jobs.27
The implied procyclicality of rms' surplus share substantially increases the volatility
27At any given point in time the cross-sectional wage distribution is degenerate because all workers
earn the same wage, but the variance of the wage is non-zero because the eciency wage moves along
the cycle.
27Table 6: Eects of worker moral hazard in the benchmark economy
Data Model
Mean 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2
u 0.0565 0.0595 0.0620 0.0645 0.0699 0.0764 0.0902
 0.9260 0.9260 0.9258 0.9255 0.9240 0.9208 0.0892
p 1.3500 1.2760 1.2760 1.2758 1.2749 1.2732 1.2565
s 0.0808 0.0806 0.0842 0.0879 0.0957 0.1053 0.1245
Standard deviation
y 0.0164 0.0172 0.0174 0.0176 0.0177 0.0177 0.0176
u 0.1934 0.0751 0.0554 0.0381 0.0196 0.0194 0.0292
v 0.1974 0.0351 0.0225 0.0237 0.0376 0.0377 0.0586
 0.3737 0.0561 0.0561 0.0560 0.0557 0.0555 0.0852
p 0.1637 0.0223 0.0223 0.0222 0.0221 0.0220 0.0339
s 0.0667 0.0798 0.0539 0.0303 0 0 0
Correlations
(vt;ut) -0.8841 0.6974 0.1667 -0.6143 -0.8740 -0.8756 -0.8662
(ut;yt) -0.2532 -0.8909 -0.9125 -0.9355 -0.9412 -0.9416 -0.9071
(pt;st) -0.4608 -0.5590 -0.5503 -0.5300                  
of p. Nonetheless, this eect is too weak to compensate the initial fall in u; in the
last column the standard deviation of p is 52% higher than in the ecient benchmark,
but the standard deviation of u is down to 0.0292 which is just to 15% of the volatility
observed in the data.
One noteworthy improvement in the performance of the model is the change in the
sign of the Beveridge curve. In the last three columns of Table 6 the model replicates the
strongly negative correlation between u and v. But even for a minimum employment
surplus of 0.02 (10% of the ecient value of NW(y9)) the model is able to generate a
Beveridge curve relationship with a corr(vt;ut) =  0:6143. Moreover, as soon as the
correlation of u and v becomes strongly negative, the correlation structure changes.
For example, with b=' = 0:02, the strongest correlation is corr(vt 1;ut) =  0:6372, so
vacancies lead unemployment by one quarter, as they do in U.S. data.
Inspection of Table 6 suggests that the sign reversal of corr(v;u) is largely due
to the fall in the volatility of s. This reduces the spike in unemployment when the
economy is hit by a negative shock, making echo eects weaker as we raise the value
of b='. The countercyclical uctuations in workers' surplus share also tend to smooth
the echo eects, since they discourage job creation in bad states, but this eect seems
small. In fact, in our results the negative correlation between u and v becomes slightly
weaker as we raise b=' beyond the value at which s becomes a constant.
28These experiments have kept all parameters the same except for the level of b=',
in order to explore the eects of moral hazard on second moments. Of course, chang-
ing b=' also aects means; the unemployment rate rises by roughly one half as we
increase b=' to 0.2. Therefore we have also run an experiment in which we repeat
the calibration procedure at each value of b=', to keep rst moments xed as far as
possible. Quantitatively, when recalibrating, the standard deviations of the logs of
unemployment and vacancies increase to 0.0539 and 0.1043 at b=' = 0:2, about 40%
higher than the gures in Table 6. Qualitatively, though, the eects are very similar
to those observed in Table 6, so we do not report them here.
5.3 Robustness
The eects of moral hazard seen in Table 6 are quite robust across a variety of parame-
terizations. Here we consider changes in our specication for initial match productivity,
and also alternative values of b and .
Random initial match value
Our baseline model assumed that new jobs are created at the top of the distribution.
A natural alternative is to suppose that a job's initial productivity is drawn from the
same distribution as subsequent shocks to x; this setup is spelled out in Appendix B.
In this case the model oers two additional margins for volatility in job nding. The
rst margin is the acceptance probability. At any given point in time only a share
(1 F(R(yt))) of the matches are accepted and this probability varies cyclically in the
opposite direction of the ring probability. The second margin is the expected surplus
share of the newly hired workers. In aggregate states with a low realized y the NSC
binds in a larger proportion of jobs ([F(b xi) F(Ri)]/[1 F(Ri)]) than in good aggregate
states with a high y. For any positive value of b=', the expected surplus share of the
rms is therefore procyclical. This second eect becomes stronger as we tighten the
NSC. In contrast, uctuations in the acceptance probability should become weaker as
we raise the value of b=', since moral hazard dampens uctuations in R.
To assess the quantitative eects of the uctuations in the hiring margin and the
surplus shares, we recalibrate the model following the same procedure as before, ad-
justed to take into account the changed zero-prot condition of rms. In Table 7 we
report the results of increasing moral hazard, holding xed the rest of the parameters.28
28For this setup too, we have run an experiment in which we recalibrate to keep rst moments
roughly constant as we increase b=', but the results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7, so
we omit them.
29Table 7: Eects of moral hazard: random initial match value
Data Model
Mean 0 0:01 0:02 0:05 0:1 0:2
u 0.0565 0.0611 0.0642 0.0673 0.0750 0.0848 0.1077
Standard deviation
u 0.1934 0.0828 0.0631 0.0448 0.0186 0.0194 0.0224
v 0.1974 0.0402 0.0261 0.0236 0.0411 0.0441 0.0541
p 0.1637 0.0464 0.0390 0.0316 0.0213 0.0227 0.0273
s 0.0667 0.0775 0.0566 0.0364 0 0 0
Correlations
(v;u) -0.8841 0.7540 0.3756 -0.3871 -0.8620 -0.8521 -0.8300
(p;s) -0.4608 -0.3633 -0.3528 -0.3466                  
Holding xed all parameters, making new jobs random has a large eect on mean
unemployment and greatly increases labor market volatility. But here, recalibrating
the parameters according to the same criteria as before, random initial match produc-
tivity raises unemployment volatility somewhat at low levels of moral hazard, but the
quantitative eects are small.29 Moreover, the overall pattern of eects from moral
hazard is unchanged.
The opportunity cost of employment
One parameter that has been central to the debate about the volatility puzzle is the
opportunity cost of employment, b. Our simulations so far have used an intermedi-
ate value for b that amounts to 71% of labor productivity. In Tables 9 and 10 (see
Appendix E) we present results assuming ratios of 40 and 80 per cent, respectively,30
holding the remaining parameters xed at their ecient benchmark values. As ex-
pected from previous studies, labor market volatility depends positively on the value
of b; a higher opportunity cost of labor leads to stronger uctuations in job creation
because it reduces the match surplus. Nonetheless, once again we nd the same pattern
of results. Sucient moral hazard eliminates the cyclical uctuations in the separation
rate, with little amplication of the uctuations in job creation.
29In our benchmark model from Table 5 the expected value of x is falling with tenure. Consequently,
in new jobs the bargained wage places a lower weight on the value of forgone leisure than in existing
jobs. This eect, which tends to dampen the uctuations in job creation, is eliminated when all the
realizations of x are drawn from the same distribution. For details on the relationship between tenure
eects and volatility, see Mortensen and Nagypal (2007b).
30We avoid going as far as the Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) calibration in order to consider a
wide range of values of b='.
30Persistence of the idiosyncratic shock process
Finally, we consider a change in the frequency of idiosyncratic shocks. As we saw in
Sec. 5.1, this parameter cannot be calibrated from aggregate ow data, and we are
unaware of any microeconomic estimates for the persistence and variance of match-
specic productivity consistent with our setup. Therefore we have simply used the
value of  from Pissarides (2007). His model replicates the quasi-elasticity of the
mean layo rate with respect to y if  is set to 0.1. Yet, in our model this parameter
choice leads to an ecient benchmark with relatively too much volatility in separation.
Therefore we explore the implications of a more persistent shock process, with  = 0:07,
which delivers smaller cyclical uctuations in separation. The results are reported in
Table 11. By decreasing uctuations in s, this parameterization also decreases the
uctuations in u, and it slightly improves the Beveridge curve correlation since the
spikes in s are smaller. Overall, though, the qualitative eects of moral hazard are the
same we have seen under other parameter congurations.
6 Conclusions
This paper has characterized the dynamics of a matching model with imperfectly ob-
servable worker eort. At a theoretical level, we showed that moral hazard may increase
unemployment volatility through two channels. It can amplify the uctuations in job
creation by making rms' surplus share procyclical, and it may amplify the uctuations
in the job destruction rate when aggregate shocks are relatively infrequent.
Nonetheless, when we calibrate the model to U.S. data we nd that moral hazard
strongly decreases the cyclical volatility of the main labor market variables. In all
our experiments the introduction of moral hazard causes a gradual reduction, and
eventually elimination, of the uctuations in the job destruction rate, and this eect
dominates the rise in uctuations in the job creation rate.
This surprising eect is the result of a time-inconsistency problem. Workers in
marginal jobs in booms turn out to be especially expensive to motivate, since they
place little value on maintaining jobs they expect to lose quickly anyway. Therefore,
having no way to commit to a long-term contract, rms may choose not to hire into such
\fragile" jobs in the rst place. This nding calls into question the robustness of the
contractual fragility mechanism advocated by Ramey and Watson (1997). Persistence
in idiosyncratic match characteristics is the crucial element absent from their work
which reverses the eect of asymmetric information problems on uctuations in match
separation.
31For the same reason, the introduction of worker moral hazard fails to help in solving
Shimer's unemployment volatility puzzle. However, moral hazard does appear consis-
tent with other features of labor market dynamics. It may help explain the relative
smoothness of separation rates over time, as compared with rates of hiring. Nonethe-
less separation remains a highly countercyclical variable in our model (as long as some
uctuation in separation remains). Our model is also successful with the several other
labor market correlations, like the fact that separation leads hiring, and the fact that
vacancies lead unemployment. Furthermore, by partially suppressing the volatility of
job destruction, moral hazard decreases the echo eects in vacancy formation. This
helps strengthen the negative correlation of unemployment with vacancies, in contrast
with the failure of the Beveridge curve in a number of previous papers with time-varying
separation.
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34A Details of algorithm
We dene an N-dimensional vector Q to summarize the complementary slackness con-
ditions (27). Given R0  x, for i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng we dene
Qi  dRi  Ri   Ri 1 if Ri < Ri 1 (41)
Qi  dSi  S(Ri;yi)   b=' if Ri = Ri 1 (42)
Thus Qi < 0 indicates that Ri is distinct from Ri 1, whereas Qi > 0 indicates that
thresholds Ri and Ri 1 collapse to a single value.
To calculate general equilibrium it suces to solve an N-dimensional root-nding
problem for Q, as follows.
0. Guess an initial vector Q.
1. Loop over aggregate states yi, for i = 1 to N, using the information in Q to
calculate Ri and S(Ri;yi).
2. For each yi, loop over intervals Ij = [Rj;Rj 1) for j 2 fi;i 1;:::;2g and nally
I1 = [R1;R0]:
(a) If Rj 1 < Rj strictly, solve (25) to calculate the increase in S on interval Ij.
(b) If Rj 1 < Rj strictly, and j  2, use equations (26) to calculate the jump
in S(x;yi) at x = Rj 1.
At this point we have constructed an increasing, upper semi-continuous surplus function
S consistent with Q. The next steps are:
3. Use equations (29), (3), and (4) to calculate tightness  and the probabilities p
and q.
4. Use (30) to calculate the worker's value NW of a new job.
We now know all the objects that appear in the surplus equation (12). On the
left-hand side of (12), Q tells us directly the value of S(Ri;yi):
S(Ri;yi) =

b=' if Qi < 0
b=' + Qi if Qi  0 (43)
To see whether separation is optimal, we can now check whether (12) holds with the
desired accuracy at the reservation productivity x = Ri for each i:31











If we nd a vector Q that satises the job destruction condition (44), then we have
found the equilibrium surplus S, as well as R, , and all other equilibrium quantities.
31Checking this equation involves integrating S(x;yi). The integral can be evaluated piecewise using
the derivative information from step 2a.
35B Random productivity of new jobs
In the main text, we assumed all new jobs start with the maximum idiosyncratic
productivity x. Here we consider an alternative model with random initial idiosyncratic
productivity, drawn from the same uniform distribution F as continuing jobs. This
implies the following changes relative to the main text. Equation (7), which describes









This formula reects the fact that some new jobs are rejected. Likewise, for the rm's






0;y)   V (y))f(x
0)dx
0
Also, in Section 3.1, if new jobs are random there is no need to dene the interval
I0  fxg consisting of the best jobs only. Instead, productivity x should be included
in the rst interval, dening I1  [R1;x].
In the denition of a no-shirking equilibrium, point 3. is replaced by:

















Thus in steps 3 and 4 of the computational algorithm, q and NW are calculated using
(45) and (46). Evaluating the integrals in (45)-(46) requires us to calculate the cutos
b x(y) at which the NSC starts to bind, because the integrals are evaluated dierently
to the left and right of b x(y).
Finally, the employment dynamics equations (31)-(33) are replaced by these two:
det(Ii) =

[(F(Ri)   F(Ri 1))(et + p((yt))ut)   et (Ii)]dt when yt+dt  yi






36C Proof of Proposition 1
We begin with a lemma that constructs a unique minimal reservation vector R con-
ditional on any appropriate (equilibrium or nonequilibrium) surplus function S.
Lemma 1. Given ;NW 2 RN
+, and given any nonnegative surplus function S(x;y)
that is weakly increasing in x for x  x, there exists a unique vector R such that:
1. R is a xed point of (20) given S,  and NW.
2. If there exists another xed point R0 of (20) then R(y)  R0(y) for all y.
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove Lemma 1 by constructing a monotone, bounded
sequence Ri of reservation productivity vectors.
Dene the N-dimensional vector R0  (x;x;:::x). Given S, , and NW, dene a
new vector R1 by iterating once on (20) evaluated at R = R0. By construction, since
the minimum in (20) is selected from x  x, we have R1(y)  R0(y) for each y.
Dene R2 by iterating once on (20) evaluated at R = R1. Since S is weakly
increasing in x, (19) shows that T is strictly increasing and unbounded in x. Also,
since S is nonnegative, T is weakly decreasing in R. Since R1  R0, these monotonicity
properties of T imply that R2(y) exists, and satises R2(y)  R1(y), for all y. By
induction, if we dene Ri+1 by iterating once on (20) evaluated at R = Ri, we obtain
Ri+1(y)  Ri(y) for all y and all i  0.
We can nd an upper bound for R by constructing a lower bound for T. Since S is
nonnegative, each element R(yi) is less than or equal to ^ R(yi), dened as follows:
^ R(yi) = min

x 2 [x;1) :
x + yi   b   p((yi))NW(yi)




So the increasing sequence of vectors Ri is bounded above by the vector ^ R, and therefore
the sequence Ri converges to a limit R.
Finally, suppose there is another xed point R0 of (20). By construction, R0  R0.
Applying (20) once to both sides of this inequality, we obtain R0  R1. Applying (20)
repeatedly to both sides, we obtain R0  Ri for all i, and therefore R0  R. Q.E.D.
We will use the notation R(S; ; NW) to indicate the minimal xed point R identied
in Lemma 1, showing explicitly its dependence on S,  and NW. Note that an increase
in S increases T, causing R(S; ; NW) to (weakly) decrease.
Proof of Prop. 1. Rustichini (1998) advocates solving dynamic incentive-constrained
models by constructing a bounded, monotone sequence of value functions. This proof
adapts Rustichini's method to deal with our surplus function and reservation vector
simultaneously. It is formally similar to the proof of Lemma 1.




r g is nonnegative, and is an upper bound to
all xed points of (21) and hence to the true surplus function. Let R(S0;;NW) be
the minimal xed point of (20) identied in Lemma 0. Set R0  R(S0;;NW).
Dene S1(x;y) by iterating once on (21), evaluated at S = S0 and R = R0.
By construction, S1(x;y)  S0(x;y) for all x and y. Also, by construction of R0,
37T(x;y;S0;R0;;NW)  b=' for x 2 [R0(y);  x]; moreover T is increasing in x. There-
fore S1 is a nonnegative function, weakly increasing in x 2 [x;1). By Lemma 0, there
exists a xed point R1  R(S1;;NW) of the mapping (20) evaluated at S = S1.
Since S1  S0, R1  R0.
Now dene S2(x;y) by iterating once on (21), evaluated at S = S1 and R = R1.
Since T is increasing in S, and S1  S0, and since T is decreasing in R, and R1  R0,
we conclude that S2(x;y)  S1(x;y) for all x and y. Also, for R1(y)  x   x,
T(x;y;S1;R1;;NW)  b='; and T is increasing in x. Therefore S2 is a nonnegative
function, weakly increasing in x 2 [x;1). By Lemma 0, there exists a xed point
R2  R(S2;;NW) of the mapping (20) evaluated at S = S2. Since S2  S1, R2  R1.
By induction, we can dene a decreasing sequence of surplus functions Si+1  Si which
all satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 0, and are therefore associated with an increasing
sequence of reservation vectors Ri+1  Ri.
The functions Si are all bounded below by zero. Therefore the sequence Si converges
to a limit  S, which is also a nonnegative function, weakly increasing in x 2 [x;1),
which has associated with it a reservation vector R  R( S;;NW). Since  S  Si for
all i, and R is decreasing in S, R  Ri for all i.
Now suppose there exists another xed point pair (S0;R0). Since S0 is an upper
bound for all other xed points of (21), and since R is decreasing in S, we have S0  S0
and R0  R0. Note that the mapping dened by (21) is increasing in S and decreasing
in R. Iterating once on (21), we obtain S1  S0 and R1  R0. Now by induction, Si
and Ri bound S0 and R0 for all i, and thus in the limit we have  S(x;y)  S0(x;y) for
all x and y and R(y)  R0(y) for all y. Q.E.D.
D Comparative statics underlying Proposition 2
To analyze the eects of moral hazard on separation rates we can perform comparative
statics on the reservation thresholds Ri with respect to the aggregate shock yi. The
derivative dR=dy shows the dierence in reservation cutos implied by a small dierence
in yi across states, and this determines the mass of ring that occurs when aggregate
productivity decreases.
Consider the simplied case analyzed in Section 4. Assume for concreteness that
b=' is small enough so that the rm's and worker's surplus shares are 1    and  in
equations (29)-(30). Assume the productivity dierence between booms and recessions,
dy  y2   y1, is small enough for linearization to be accurate; also abbreviate dR 
R2   R1 and dS  S(R1;y2)   S(R1;y1).
We can then linearize the job destruction equation by subtracting (28) evaluated at
y = y1 from the same equation at y = y2. If we do so assuming that R2 < R1 strictly,
so that S(Ri;yi)) = b=', we obtain












0   (b=' + dS)
 dR + dy   dpN
W + F
0(R)(b=')dR + (1   F(R))dS   (b=' + dS)
38Table 8: Two aggregate states: relation between yi and thresholds Ri
Case Surplus at threshold Dierence in thresholds
 = 0, b=' = 0 S(R1;y1) = S(R2;y2) = 0 dR =   r+
r+F(R)+q=(1 )dy
 = 0, b=' > 0 S(R1;y1) = S(R2;y2) = b=' dR =   r+
r+F(R)+q=(1 ) (r+)F0(R)b='dy
 > 0, b=' > 0 S(R1;y1) = S(R2;y2) = b=' dR =
[r+2+F(R)+q=(1 )]b=' (r++)dy
r++F(R)+q=(1 ) (r++)F0(R)b='
 > 0, b=' > 0 dS = 1
r+2+F(R)+q=(1 )dy R1 = R2  R
On the other hand, if we linearize assuming that R2 = R1  R, we obtain







Using the other equilibrium relationships to solve out for dR or dS, we nd the multi-
pliers summarized in Table 8.
The table analyzes several cases in order of increasing complexity. If  = b=' = 0
(no moral hazard, and no transitions across aggregate states), an increase in aggregate
productivity lowers the reservation threshold unambiguously: dR=dy < 0. In the
second line of the table, by allowing for a small amount of moral hazard, b=' > 0, the
denominator of the multiplier becomes smaller, so dR=dy becomes more negative. That
is, when  = 0, adding moral hazard increases the dierence between the reservation
thresholds, so there would be a larger boost in ring if the economy were to move from
boom to recession (though at  = 0, this transition occurs with zero probability).
In the third line of the table, we continue to assume that R2 < R1 strictly, but we
allow for  > 0 and b=' > 0. Note, though, that dR is no longer proportional to dy,
because the non-negligible quantity





' enters the numerator
of the multiplier formula. But note therefore that it is impossible to have R2 < R1
strictly unless the numerator in the third line is positive. Simplifying, we nd that
R2 < R1 requires
b='
r +  + 
<
y2   y1
r + F(R) + q=(1   )
as stated in Prop. 2.
Intuitively, the reservation productivities may dier if there is no moral hazard
(b=' = 0), or if the probability of moving from recession to boom is low ( small),
or if aggregate productivity is suciently large in booms compared with recessions
(dy large). But if these conditions are not satised, then rms prefer not to maintain
39any workers with x < R1 in booms, because the wage that must be paid to these
workers in order to maintain the no-shirking incentive is too high to justify continuation.
In that case, the two thresholds collapse, R1 = R2  R. At x = R, the surplus
equals b=' in recessions, but it is strictly higher in booms, since the worker is more
productive. The comparative statics equations then no longer serve to determine dR;
instead, they determine the dierence between the surpluses in booms and recessions,
dS  S(R;y2)   S(R;y1) = S(R;y2)   b=', as shown in the last line of the table.
E Additional tables
Table 9: Low opportunity cost of employment
Data Model
Mean 0 0:01 0:02 0:05 0:1 0:2
u 0.0565 0.5935 0.0605 0.0617 0.0643 0.0674 0.0737
Standard deviation
u 0.1934 0.0360 0.0270 0.0187 0.0094 0.0093 0.0092
v 0.1974 0.0172 0.0112 0.0111 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179
p 0.1637 0.0106 0.0106 0.0106 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105
s 0.0667 0.0393 0.0270 0.0154 0 0 0
Correlations
(v;u) -0.8841 0.7030 0.2286 -0.5634 -0.8730 -0.8738 -0.8754
(p;s) -0.4608 -0.5420 -0.5383 -0.5229                  
Table 10: High opportunity cost of employment
Data Model
Mean 0 0:01 0:02 0:05 0:1 0:2
u 0.0565 0.0597 0.0634 0.0667 0.0748 0.0844 0.1352
Standard deviation
u 0.1934 0.1091 0.0794 0.0544 0.0284 0.0281 0.0690
v 0.1974 0.0501 0.0319 0.0351 0.0551 0.0552 0.1518
p 0.1637 0.0326 0.0326 0.0325 0.0323 0.0322 0.0862
s 0.0667 0.1135 0.0754 0.0419 0 0 0
Correlations
(v;u) -0.8841 0.6917 0.1105 -0.6521 -0.8745 -0.8767 -0.8327
(p;s) -0.4608 -0.5720 -0.5593 -0.5354                  
40Table 11: High persistence of idiosyncratic shocks
Data Model
Mean 0 0:01 0:02 0:05 0:1 0:2
u 0.0565 0.0595 0.0610 0.0624 0.0652 0.0689 0.0767
Standard deviation
u 0.1934 0.0543 0.0406 0.0287 0.0196 0.0195 0.0270
v 0.1974 0.0242 0.0230 0.0294 0.0375 0.0375 0.0531
p 0.1637 0.0221 0.0221 0.0221 0.0220 0.0220 0.0310
s 0.0667 0.0538 0.0347 0.0170 0 0 0
Correlations
(v;u) -0.8841 0.1527 -0.4917 -0.8318 -0.8728 -0.8841 -0.8635
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 1a. reports data for the cyclical uctuations in the quarterly transition rates between employment
and unemployment for the U.S. economy for the period 1951 - 2004. The original data are constructed
by Shimer and are corrected for possible time-aggregation biases. For more details, see footnote 25.
Fig. 1b. reports JOLTS data on hiring and layo rates for the total non-farming sector available at
www.bls.gov/jlt/. We have adjusted the layo data for seasonal eects.
42Fig. 2a.  Surplus functions without moral hazard
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Fig. 2c.  Surplus functions under moral hazard:   
Acyclical job destruction
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